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IAC-D-96/2
3 April 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT : Report of IAC ad hoc Working Group on Emergency Plans
REFERENCE : IAC-D-96/1, 20 February 1956
 IAC-M-232, 28 February 1956, item 6

I. Background:

1. In recognition of the probable impact of emergency situations on the functioning of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) proposed that the IAC jointly examine, for planning purposes, the problems associated with the operation of the IAC in wartime or an assumed wartime situation. The planned Operation Alert 1956 would provide a preliminary testing ground for tentative solutions for the problems identified below. The Working Group was charged with

- a. examination of the impact of war on the functions of the IAC, and
- b. identification of problems that may arise at Operation Alert 1956, and recommendation of procedures for their solution.

2. At the 251st National Security Council (NSC) meeting on 9 June 1955, the NSC, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, noted the President's statement that future tests of the emergency relocation plan should include a number of NSC meetings, with a view to assuring that emergency relocation plans will enable the Council, under wartime conditions, to meet frequently and function effectively as the key policy advisory body to the President. (NSC Action No. 1412-c).

3. On 13 June 1955 the President approved the NSC Emergency Relocation Plan as expressed in NSC 5521. Paragraph 2.a. of this document contains the following statement of assumption:

"Under wartime conditions, the President will utilize the NSC to advise him on national security policies. The NSC will be convened by the President intermittently, on such occasions, and at such places, as he may from time to time elect."

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

II. Assumptions:

1. As a result of the above two statements of emergency operation of the NSC, the DCI has assumed that the NSC will continue to look to him for national intelligence advice and support. He will continue to look to the IAC as the top intelligence advisory body for national intelligence in wartime as in peacetime.
2. The joint responsibilities of CIA and the Department of Defense for the wartime conduct of clandestine activities are not within the scope of this paper.

III. Discussion:

1. The integration of political, economic, scientific, and military intelligence in wartime will continue to be accomplished in the form of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE). In time of war, the main NIE effort will be concentrated on:

- a. specific requests from the NSC;
- b. enemy potentials, exploitable vulnerabilities (excluding targetting) and intentions, all three to include scientific, technical, economic, political and certain broad military aspects;
- c. evaluations of the probable courses of action of uncommitted countries;
- d. evaluations of capabilities and requirements of allied and/or uncommitted economies; and
- e. timely estimates of probable post-war economic and political situations in various parts of the world.

2. To accomplish these purposes the following modifications of the present NIE mechanism activities are believed necessary:

- a. There will be a greater number of special or "crash" estimates covering specific wartime problems rather than broad country estimates.
- b. The speed with which NIE's are produced will have to be stepped up, and geared to meet a large number of less comprehensive requirements.
- c. The production of periodic (monthly or perhaps biweekly) global intelligence reviews may be desirable broadly to outline the global picture and make general short-term projections.
- d. Intelligence estimates for post-hostilities planning should be on a national intelligence level.

S-E-C-R-E-T

S-E-C-R-E-T

3. Up to this point in the discussion, the Working Group has been attempting to identify the types of action which the intelligence arm of the NSC will probably have to perform in time of emergency. We believe that if these concepts are sound, no policy matters with regard to operational concept presently exist which need to be resolved by the IAC. After examination of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID) and the implementing Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID), we believe that our concepts are consistent with the policies stated in those directives.

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations:

1. The Impact of War on the Functions of the IAC: Our conclusion is that the impact of war will have little if any effect on the responsibilities of the IAC, subject to further clarification of the role of the NSC in wartime.

Recommendation: That the IAC approve the above conclusions.

2. Assuming acceptance by the IAC of the preceding paragraph, the following procedural and logistic problems are identified and, for planning purposes, the following remedial action is recommended.

a. Location of IAC Meetings During the Initial Phase: Since the first phase of hostilities is envisioned as primarily military, there is firm requirement for the military members of the IAC to remain with their chiefs. As the flow of military intelligence will represent the main source of information concerning the enemy during this primary phase, it is logical that the chiefs of the military service intelligence agencies and the DCI will play their most important role during this period.

Recommendation: If relocation plans must be implemented, we believe that meetings of the IAC should be held at or near the Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC) during the initial phase of the emergency.

b. Location of IAC Meetings During Balance of Hostilities: As new situations develop after the initial phase which require major policy decisions by the President and for which national intelligence support is needed, the operation of the IAC will be accommodated to the requirements levied on it. By this period of the war, we believe that the IAC principals or their designees could meet at a convenient location not necessarily the relocation center of any one member but centrally located so that minimum travel would be required.

Recommendation: That appropriate locations be established for meetings of the IAC after the initial phase of the war. Action by CIA, in consonance with over-all U.S. Government emergency plans, for such establishment is recommended.

S-E-C-R-E-T

c. Scheduled Production of National Intelligence Estimates:

Since the disruption of normal intelligence production activities during the initial phases of the war must be faced, a reduced intelligence production program stressing immediate critical areas should be developed. There will be a critical requirement for Special NIEs which will be supported primarily by current military intelligence. Concurrently, there will exist a requirement for NIEs for those nations not yet committed to hostilities. As the decisive phase in the war is reached, NIEs should again take precedence over special estimates to insure adequate national planning for the economic, political and psychological problems of the final stages of the war as well as for the postwar era.

Recommendation: That the production of NIEs be adjusted during the opening phase of the war to deal with the current situation as first priority business; that NIEs on the uncommitted countries be given second priority; and that when the decisive phase of the war is reached, there be a reexamination of NIE requirement with appropriate rescheduling.

d. Inter-Agency Participation in National Intelligence Production: If the assumption is valid that the general procedures of national intelligence production will be only slightly changed for wartime operation, then the participation of representatives of all members of the IAC will be required. These personnel should have experience in the estimative process, and they should not be burdened with general liaison responsibilities.

Recommendation: If relocation plans must be put into effect, we recommend that CIA provide facilities for personnel of other agencies while these personnel are working with the Board of National Estimates on the preparation of NIEs.

e. Subcommittees of the IAC: Because much of the detailed base upon which NIEs are constructed is the product of working level liaison among the members of the IAC, we believe that most of the IAC subcommittees need to continue to function in wartime.

Recommendation: That each subcommittee of the IAC which has a wartime utility be instructed to prepare a wartime plan of operation. Any subcommittee which feels it does not have a wartime function should request corroboration of its opinion from the IAC.

3. Participation of the IAC in Operation Alert 1956: In connection with the operation of the IAC during Operation Alert 1956, we have identified the following problem areas and have recommended procedures for solution.

S-E-C-R-E-T

a. A decision by the IAC needs to be made as to whether during Operation Alert 1956 the community will

- (1) play a simulated exercise,
- (2) deal with live intelligence, or
- (3) use a combination of both with live intelligence taking priority.

Because only a small portion of the total staff of any agency will be relocated, the live situation can be handled both in Washington and with the facilities in the Relocation Centers, thus providing a check on the remote operation.

Recommendation: That the intelligence community deal only with live intelligence during Operation Alert 1956. The subcommittees should operate on the same basis.

b. Logistics: Each agency is charged with the operation and maintenance of its own relocation center. Communications between relocation centers whether electrical, courier, or transportation is a common problem.

Recommendation: That each agency be responsible for its communications needs during Operation Alert 1956, and existing interagency arrangements be modified to fit dispersal requirements.

c. Liaison: As is implied in paragraph IV.2.d above, there are certain liaison problems beyond the participation in national intelligence production. We believe that the exchange of liaison officers is desirable based on experience in Operation Alert 1955.

Recommendation: That the exchange of liaison officers be agreed between agencies on a bilateral basis.

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[redacted]
Chairman
Ad Hoc Working Group on Emergency Plans

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